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The Violence of Post-Racial Memory
and the Political Sense of Mourning
  Alfred Frankowski 
Abstract
In this paper I argue that “post-raciality” entails a way of
remembering that depoliticizes the social meaning of memory
and thus of history.  Through aesthetic critique, I attempt to
show how the hyper-production of memory obscures the very
real forms of violence directed toward non-whites.  By
developing the aesthetic critiques of W.E.B. Du Bois and
Walter Benjamin, I argue that representing former violence as
social memory fails to adequately address subtle forms of
cultural and residual violence.  Furthermore, I argue that post-
racial memory produces sites and representations of the past
only to enact a type of social forgetting in the present.  I
develop a political sense of mourning as a form of resistance
against the violence of post-racial memory.
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1. Post-racial aesthetics and the violence of social
forgetting
An old adage of political wisdom holds that those who do not
remember the failures of the past will be doomed to repeat
them in the present.  This wisdom has become convenient at
best.  If the atrocities of the past are in danger of being
forgotten, then we would need to counter this by
memorializing these events in order to resist the inertia of
forgetting.  But at present, forgetting, in precisely this sense,
is not the sign of danger for us in the way it is usually
imagined.  Despite the convenience of the adage, we already
live in a time awash with reminders of the injustices of the
past.  Where we fail is in measuring the meaning of our former
violence against how we forget even in a time of abundant
memory.
Social forgetting is far more political than we might initially
think since it includes not only what is forgotten, but also the
way in which events are remembered. I think this is especially
true in terms in the present where the remembering and
forgetting of anti-black violence takes on an altogether
different political meaning.  In the summer of 2011, The New
York Times ran an article that discussed the “obscure” race riot
of 1921 in Tulsa, Oklahoma.  The article recalled that in 1921
a mob of white Tulsa citizens attacked and lynched blacks
indiscriminately and U.S. military planes were used to bomb
and destroy the forty blocks of the city known as Black Wall
Street.  After eighteen hours of carnage, an estimated three
hundred black citizens had been lynched and 8,000 black
citizens had lost their homes.[1]  Businesses were burnt to the
ground and the bodies of men, women, and children littered
the streets, hung from trees and bridges, or were stuffed in
barrels and other containers.[2]  
By all measures, Tulsa, Oklahoma is the site where the most
destructive anti-black violence was carried out over the
shortest time period in American history, and yet this mass
lynching is still configured as a type of forgetting despite its
very public record.  What this says about how we relate to
entrenched cultural violence in the present has everything to
do with the role that social forgetting plays in underscoring
violence even when the problem of forgetting seems to be
resolved. 
Addressing how we forget is an issue of how aesthetics relates
to the political.  The violence of Tulsa, Oklahoma was
meaningful not only for the people of Tulsa who survived that
violence. The remembrance as well as the forgetting of
violence of the past is only possible because it unfolds in a
particular environment.  The  mass lynching in Tulsa in 1921 is
meaningful for us now because it is now (as before) because it
is continually and actively forgotten.  Forgetting, in this
particular sense, requires an aesthetic critique in place of a
political critique because it is  in relation to an aesthetic
critique that one can capture the social aspects of formative
violence.  I use aesthetic in its broadest and most critical
sense to refer to the conditions of the possibility of our
sensibility.  An aesthetic critique refers to the conditions under
which something appears or can be made to appear and,
conversely, the conditions under which something does not
appear or can be made not to appear.  In this sense, the
violence of Tulsa is not only a past phenomenon that appears
now with only historical import; it is also a present
phenomenon that discloses a type of violence particular to
post-raciality.  Thus the meanings of the ways in which some
things appear or do not appear are open for interrogation.
While the term 'violence,'  in a broad sense, can refer to either
explicit acts of violence committed by some people against
other people, animals, and environments, or implicit acts of
violence that are implied by traditions, embodied in
institutions, or operative in laws, I employ this term to refer to
systematic violence only.  Explicit violence does not appear in
a vacuum but is precipitated by social environments or sets of
traditions that harbor implicit forms of violence latent within
them. Implicit violence does not end at the cessation of the
most grotesque and abhorrent manifestations of that violence;
rather, it often continues on in residual and systematic ways.
An aesthetic critique addresses not only the explicit
manifestation of violence but also the conditions that retain
and maintain violence in its residual forms.  And it is this type
of violence, this relationship to aesthetics, that is at play in
both the relationship of remembrance to forgetting the mass
lynchings of Tulsa in 1921 and, more generally, to post-racial
memory itself.
By giving an analysis of post-raciality along aesthetic lines, I
am not proposing that this supplants the importance of
political critique.  I do not want to reduce the importance of
 coming to grips with the actual violence of anti-black violence
by focusing on this aesthetic form of violence.  But I do hold
that we can do little to actually come to grips with anti-black
violence unless we also broaden our analysis of violence to
include aesthetic violence.  This requires that we consider how
violence is not only immediate but establishes traditions,
relations, and continues despite legal redress and the
dismantling of its core institutions.  
In remembering Tulsa’s mass lynching, for example, it is not
enough to attempt to address this violence through memory;
we also need to consider how memory and forgetting are
commensurate with a type of residual and aesthetic violence.
First, we might assume that the event is forgotten because no
one is around to tell the stories or everyone left or kept quiet
about the events.  There is some truth to this, but at present
there are forty people living in Tulsa who were witnesses to
the mass lynching.  The survivors do tell their stories and this
serves as a type of remembering.  Second, we might assume
that there is no memory because there has been no public
recognition of the mass lynching.  However, there have been
larger projects to support the memory of what happened  in
Tulsa as well as the history of  the black community that
existed before the riot.  These are the efforts of the John Hope
Franklin Center for Reconciliation, which serves as a museum,
memorial, and park.  Despite the existence of the park and its
museum, few people really know what it is meant to
memorialize.  Part of the reason for this may be that the event
has never been taught in schools and the memories
themselves have never been contextualized in history.  But
this has been addressed more recently, and 2012 marks the
first time the mass lynching has been taught in schools.  It is
hard to say that it has not been recognized in a political sense
if recognition requires a political form of address.  Third, we
can maintain that the mass lynching is forgotten in the sense
that there have never been larger forums for representation
and redress.  But the Tulsa mass lynching has been the
subject of several prolonged lawsuits, several books, and at
least two documentaries.[3]  The question that Tulsa 1921
prompts is not about memory at all, but it has everything to
do with how memory supplies a type of social forgetting that
supports the violence of post-raciality.
In what follows, I will explore how aesthetic discontinuity
reveals a domain of social memory that actually supports the
philosophical claims of post-racial discourse and, in doing this,
insulates political analysis from disclosing post-racial
memory’s violence.  I will argue that post-raciality has a
particular type of memory that remembers only as forgetting.
To do so I will combine analyses of contemporary critiques of
social memory and racism to the more systemic aesthetic
critiques of memory, racism, and history found in W.E.B. Du
Bois and Walter Benjamin.
2. Social forgetting as post-racial memory 
What legitimates the claim that we are currently in a post-
racial moment?  Let me begin by laying out what post-
raciality’s philosophical claims are in a minimal sense and
consider how they relate to the aesthetics of social memory
and forgetting. Post-raciality is defined as the term that makes
sense out of the claim that in our society we are presently
seeing signs that we are “beyond race and racism.”[4]  To be
beyond race and racism means that the old stigmas and
structures that oppressed non-whites no longer apply to our
society. Post-raciality is often associated with the assertion
that our society has arrived at that long-forecasted moment in
history when race simply does not matter.  Examples of blacks
occupying leading roles in society abound as self-evident proof
of this claim, but these cases occur in contrast to statistics and
material reality.  For instance, the election of President Barack
Obama is represented as a sign of “how far we have come”
socially in abandoning our racist social past.  But this ignores
statistical data that show that violence against blacks and
other, economic, forms of discrimination against non-whites
have increased during his Presidency.  The representation is
not only at odds with the material reality; it completely
displaces it.
There is a more general claim about post-raciality that
requires us to consider the way aesthetics and politics are at
play in it. A post-racial society is not one that conceals or
omits the memory of its racist past but rather the contrary.
 Thus the claims of post-raciality are tied to the proliferation of
memory, and we need to uncover what the social meaning of
this proliferation is.  The claim is that contemporary American
society is at a point where we can recognize the violence of
the past and talk openly about the history of American race
and racism.  This is a broad claim that requires that the
antipathy toward non-white communities and to their history
can be addressed in a way that does not distort the way in
which whites have benefited from, and continue to benefit
from, institutions, traditions, and practices that have been
based on the exploitation of non-whites.  
The problem is not simply one of representation.   Black
History Month, Martin Luther King Jr. memorials and various
other memorial days may be well-placed and necessary, along
with museums to the history of racist images.  But they are
not signs of social progress when images of the social reform
achieved through civil rights legislation overlay the regresses
that silently took shape a mere decade after the civil rights
movement.[5]  The signs of achievement are two-fold because
they work as signs of memory, but they also set up the
conditions for the possibility of becoming socially numb to the
past or of socially forgetting the totality of former and present
violence. 
Memory often makes the present comprehensible, but to
remember the forgotten simply makes the present strange.  As
in the case of the history of Tulsa’s mass lynching, it is strange
to talk about any lynching as being something forgotten when
there is not even a historical record that has been suppressed.
For instance, here is the newspaper description of the 1934
lynching of Claude Neale,  a black farmhand who was accused
of raping and murdering a young white woman in Florida:
First they cut off his penis.  He was made to eat
it.  Then they cut off his testicles and made him
eat them and say he liked it.  Then they sliced his
sides and stomach with knives and every now
and then someone would cut off a finger or a toe.
 Red hot irons were used on the nigger to burn
him from top to bottom.  From time to time
during the torture a rope would be tied around
Neale’s neck and he would be pulled over a limb
and held there until he almost chocked to death,
when he would be let down and the torture
begun all over again. Neale’s body was tied to
the rear of an automobile and dragged over the
highway to the Cannidy home.  Here a mob
estimated to number somewhere between 3,000
to 7,000 people from eleven southern states was
excitedly waiting his arrival…. A woman came out
of the Cannidy house and drove a butcher knife
into his heart.  Then the crowd came by and
some kicked him and some drove their cars over
him.  What remained of the body was brought by
the mob to Marianna, where it is now hanging
from a tree on the northeast corner of the
courthouse.  Photographers say they will soon
have pictures of the body for sale at fifteen cents
each.  Fingers and toes from Neale’s body are
freely exhibited on street-corners here.[6]
For our public imagination, lynchings are private, random, and
isolated.  We forget how public they are even when they are
described in an accurate light.  This aspect of lynching is
“whitewashed” from memory as much as can be, but it is the
public dynamics of the lynching that provide the aesthetics of
the conditions that makes it meaningful.  There is no such
thing as a private lynching since the practice is meant to put
the results of its violence on display.  And yet in reducing it to
the private, isolated, and random, a mode of social forgetting
is at work.  
The public dynamics of lynching are not simple; their meaning
shifts relative to how they are retained.  Neale’s lynching
continued to be represented aesthetically and politically from it
he moments preceding his death onward. Not only is the
lynching itself a public event, it takes place in two towns.
Furthermore, the body is hung for a period of time in front of
the court house.  His fingers, toes and other parts were
displayed and photographs were available for purchase at the
corner store.  Moreover, the article first appeared in a Florida
newspaper in 1934.  It likely appeared as a report to amuse
curious readers, but its publication both expanded the space
over which the lynching could reach and extended the time
over which the lynching cast its shadow.  We can see how this
document has the effect of needing to appear in a way that
reaffirmed the political normativity of white supremacy.  In
addition, it provided the needed information as to where to
find the material evidence of this supremacy.  
The public dynamics of Neale’s lynching do not end there.  In
1997, the newspaper account appeared again in Angela Davis’
Blues Legacies as part of her discussion of Billie Holiday’s
song, “Strange Fruit.”  This time the account of Neale’s
lynching illustrated the whites’ inhumanity to blacks as it
depicted the horrors of lynching.  In its historical context, the
text about Neale’s lynching further illustrated  blacks’
vulnerability because they could be murdered at any time for
any reason.  Davis’ point is that the way aesthetics relates to
politics is to allow an awakening of race/political-consciousness
against a background of the normative status quo.  
Davis argued that aesthetics reveals the extent to which
general sensibility has been politicized or depoliticized.[7]  In
the newspaper’s account as well as in Davis’ account, the
lynching is not merely a matter of remembering what
happened to Neale but also a matter of bringing a type of
violence into view in a way that shows exactly what was out of
view before. The public nature of Neale’s lynching can only
appear in relation to one or another political context.  It
appears by indicating exactly what form of aesthetics must be
out of play. It is not memory but forgetting that frames the
two discourses of violence here.  This frame requires a
particular structure of knowledge.  It frames a discourse in
which something is absent, unknown, or too obscure to
appear, and one that is simply barred from appearing
legitimately and thus forms an illegitimate discourse or trivial
knowledge.  In either case, it consists in what we continually
fail to recognize or fail to know.
Forgetting, in this sense, supports a type of political
relationship to what is recognized as known or worth knowing.
In his essay “White Ignorance,” Charles Mills examines this
aspect of forgetting in relation to a particular form of
epistemology called “white ignorance.”  He argues that
ignorance establishes just this sort of limitation by being an
absence of correct knowledge, on the one hand, and
adherence to false knowledge, on the other.[8]  He holds that
knowledge and ignorance are socially contextual, and socially
developed.[9]  Therefore, the social significance of memory
can be read as a type of social index of the present.  Mills
writes, “If previously whites were color demarcated as
biologically and culturally unequal and superior, now through a
strategic ‘color-blindness’ they are assimilated as putative
equals to the status and situations of nonwhites on terms that
negate the need to repair the inequalities of the past.”[10]
 What is implied in his argument is that white social
epistemology is the prop that conceals a type of white memory
that doubles as white amnesia.  He also holds that this is a
type of memory that disarticulates white social advantages by
eliminating the present’s social relation to a long history of
structural violence.  This is what Mills refers to as the
management of memory, a practice that reinforces violent
traditions explicitly or implicitly. He argues that this
management results in a type of amnesia that is selective at
best, but stops short of calling such management itself a type
of violence.[11]
Mills’ argument implies two additional claims.  He claims that
there is a type of amnesia that attaches itself to history, which
is politically driven, and that there is another type of amnesia
that is felt or sensed in a way that shapes our cultural
memory. Mills employs both meanings when he holds that the
general population seems ignorant to the point of being
amnesiac about even the most well-known forms of
discrimination, such as the Jim Crow laws or the lynch laws or
the history of the one-drop rule.[12]  However, the problem
seems to be more complicated than may first appear.  If
amnesia were the issue, then we might be able to correct this
faulty relationship with appropriate reminders.  For instance, a
reconciliation park that functions as both a memorial and a
museum that stores images of a 1921 mass lynching would be
the right type of reminder, but the type of social forgetting
that Mills identifies seems to resist such ways of addressing
this type of problem.
If we retain the metaphor of “amnesia,” then we must further
examine how it is resistant to the immediate aesthetic
presentation that contradicts it.  The type of epistemology
Mills is working with cannot be disentangled from a social form
of aesthetics since, according to Mills, memory is not only
about what we know but about what we perceive and how we
perceive what we retain as perception or representation.  What
is missing is the context of post-raciality.  At present, we see a
proliferation of sources of memory.  The books, articles, and
online resources make old school ignorance nearly impossible,
since there is no want for representations or other forms of
aesthetic evidence.  But this is the heart of Mills’ point, in that
white ignorance forms a special theory of knowledge.  White
ignorance knows exactly what it claims not to know. 
Contrary to the psychological form of amnesia, the cultural
amnesia of white ignorance appears on the back of a
systematic form of forgetting that puts certain aspects of the
past out of play over and over again.  This is not only an
epistemological point; it is also an aesthetic one since it
concerns not only the way knowledge is established or fails,
but also how history appears or fails to appear.  It requires
that we develop (a) an aesthetic sense of post-racial memory
that holds that representations allow for the type of forgetting
that is needed in order to justify the idea that we are living in
a post-racial society, and (b) that we consider how post-racial
memory continues a form of violence while making history
more accessible than ever.  This form of amnesia is not
continuous with memory but makes memory stand in for social
forgetting.
To gain some perspective on how aesthetics and history relate
to post-raciality, I will refer to Du Bois and Benjamin’s ideas
on history, memory, forgetting, and mourning.  I think we
need to reframe these muted questions so that they take aim
at a concept of history that becomes clearly problematic when
politics and aesthetics intersect.
3.  The aesthetic critique of history
In this section I will focus on how Du Bois and Benjamin’s
critiques of history engage the aesthetics of social memory
and forgetting as a way of critiquing residual systematic
violence. History emphasizes its aesthetic relationship to the
collective lives and deaths of a community, but it does not do
so without equally entering into the political.  By following 
how they problematize history, we will be able to re-examine
the aesthetic-political relationship of forgetting to the social
violence of post-racial memory.  Moreover, what is particularly
relevant about reading Du Bois and Benjamin in this context is
seeing how their aesthetic works argue for a way of reading
the intersection between politics and aesthetics as a type of
refashioning (Umfunktionierung) of the present toward
violence to which it has become numb.  Both of them
problematize history in order to broach the question of
refashioning our concept of history as an oppressive system
via  I will start with Du Bois, since he offers a general critique
that will serve us well in highlighting the problematic structure
with which we are dealing.   
Du Bois’ critique of the concept of history appears in the
closing chapter of Black Reconstruction in America entitled
“Propaganda of History.”  Du Bois describes the book as a
materialist history that seeks to expose the material conditions
that forged class and race struggle in America.  However, the
last chapter of the book further problematizes the way neglect
(or social forgetting) constitutes the material conditions for
historical representation as a whole.  He writes, “The chief
witness in Reconstruction, the emancipated slave himself, has
been almost barred out of court.  His written Reconstruction
record has been largely destroyed and nearly always
neglected.”[13]  The problem is not simply one that can be
settled by getting “history” right, nor is it one that can be
settled by including more historical perspectives.  Instead, the
problem is more severe than it may first appear to be since his
critique is  aimed, not only at those who write history or at
how we write history, but also at the social implications of
embedding a type of forgetting within our concept of history
itself.
What follows is that “history” is neither a scientific
reconstruction of a collective set of events nor is it a benign
activity of social memory:  it is based on an active and
deliberate form of neglect.  Du Bois writes that the history of
reconstruction shows that, “… the most unfair caricatures of
Negroes have been carefully preserved; but serious speeches,
successful administration and upright character are almost
universally forgotten.”[14]  The tension between remembering
and forgetting does not simply concern knowledge or the
production of knowledge, but the aesthetic environment that
maintains violence as a form of forgetting.[15]  Du Bois
argues, “The real frontal attack on Reconstruction, as
interpreted by the leaders of national thought in 1870 and for
some time thereafter, came from the universities and
particularly from Columbia and Johns Hopkins.”[16]  Du Bois’
critique holds that normative violence is a matter of
misrepresentation to the point of neglect or selective
forgetfulness.  To counter this violence, he suggests that
another type or order of question is needed, one that asks not
only about the politics of history but also about  the political in
relation to our concept of history.  What does it mean to think
that remembrance itself performs the act of forgetting?  I
think this suggests that we have to suspend our tendency to
simplify this proposition by considering how remembrance may
also enact forgetting.  When forgetting is not simply a sign of
violence but comes to form the effect of memory, then the
entire condition for discourse must be rethought as violence,
and this must be done on a fundamentally aesthetic level.
To do this, I would like to examine the same critical point as it
appears in  Benjamin’s Theses called “On the Concept of
History.”  As with Du Bois’ critique of history, Benjamin’s
critique focuses on the tension between the history of the
victor and the history of the oppressed.  Unlike Du Bois, he
extends his argument to also suggest that the aesthetic
critique of our concept of history requires a re-fashioning of
our sensibility in a way that connects the violence of the past
to the way in which we are unable to empathize with the way
similar forms of violence are operative in the present.   At the
heart of Benjamin’s critique of history is the notion of
“refashioning.” Irving Wohlfarth argues, for this reason, that
for Benjamin history is written from “below” and not surveyed
from above.[17]  He emphasizes how Benjamin’s critical
notion of historical materialism is directed against all dominant
forms of history and is not only applicable to history written by
fascist regimes.  But Wohlfarth’s characterization of Benjamin
seems only partially true because his characterization implies
that Benjamin’s view poses a duality between history as
something written from “above” and history as something
written from “below.”  To hold that either pole could refashion
the subject of history on its own would be absurd because a
history from below, just like a history from above, derives its
valuation from the same normative structure without
problematizing this structure itself.  The point is, therefore, not
simply to shift the location of the analysis but also its method.
 We need new questions that cut to the core of oppression and
not simply new voices that speak of their oppression.
I think what is further implied in Benjamin’s thinking is that
dominant traditions (whether they come from above or below)
contain something like negative violence, a violence that
violates its subjects by putting certain questions out of play.
Benjamin writes, “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us
that the “state of emergency (Ausname)” in which we live is
not the exception (Ausname), but the rule.  We must attain to
a conception of history that accords with this insight.”[18]
Ausname is a term that can be used equally to state that
something is the exception or that something is designated as
an emergency, but essentially it designates that which remains
undetermined or outside of the scope of being named.  To put
something out of the scope of naming is to say there is
something to be said,but that words are inadequate to address
or capture it—and yet, this absence indicates the unnamed
even in failing to name it.  And it is this failure that appears as
a condition that precedes the liquidation of the insight of the
oppressed.
What does it mean to fashion a conception of history according
to the insight of the oppressed?  To clarify this point I think it
is necessary to review Benjamin’s Theses on history according
to his concepts of Ursprung and Trauer, which he develops in
his Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (generally translated
as Origin of German Tragic Drama).  Benjamin argues that as
Trauerspiels depart from tragedy, they make something
appear that tragedies cannot conjure up.  They problematize
the broken in a way that requires a complete set of social and
political interventions.  To underscore the importance of the
broken in its relation to history, Benjamin makes use of the
term “Origin” (Ur-sprung).  He takes the term Ursprung to
have a dual sense.  One the one hand, it refers to a source
point, the place from which something has started.  On the
other, it refers to the closing off, the liquidation, of some
tradition by means of that which breaks from that former
tradition.[19]  To rethink history as a type of tracing out of
origins is to bring thought to bear on the point where a social
order “jumps out” or breaks from tradition.  To speak of an
origin of Trauerspiel, for instance, is to tease out the tradition
of mourning plays to where it breaks with the tradition of
tragedy.[20]  In doing this, Benjamin is highlighting the
significance of mourning by showing how it fragments the
tradition established by tragic drama.  In the reduction of
mourning to a de-politicized state, tragedy discloses a
tendency to consolidate Trauerspiels as being a variation of
the same art, placing its differences at odds with, and not in
critique of, the tragic arts.  This configuration merely moves
violence into the hands of the critic as opposed to dismantling
it from its root.
What is central to Traurspiels is mourning.  Unlike
Trauerspiels, what makes tragedies powerful is that, despite
the fact that they stretch beyond social memory, they make
sense of our current institutions and traditions.  Trauerspiels,
by contrast, are altogether different.   David Krasner  argues
that for Benjamin, “Trauerspiel offers neither order nor
closure.  Expressions of grief are continuous, time is
unfulfilled, and mourning is the only response to an
incomprehensible injustice.”[21]  They present the forgotten
as forgotten or the broken as broken.  Thus, an aesthetic
difference emerges where the normative is held only to
illustrate what has broken from our sensibility and what
continues to break in our normativity. This difference also
amplifies a type of sensible numbness.  Benjamin’s sense of
mourning concerns a refashioning of our sensibility toward the
violence that is our shared violence, and it is this failure of a
shared stake in past violence that constitutes post-racial
memory as a type of violence.
The violence of post-racial memory firmly places the racial
violence of our society in the past, but mourning, in
Benjamin’s sense, captures what is necessarily untimely and
out of place.[22]  Trauerspiels, he argues, is a form that is
meant to unsettle. “Its intrusion could therefore be described
as a disturbance of the peace and disruption of law and order
in the arts,” he says.[23]  Mourning makes what remains
disarticulated in the memory a point of agitation for the
present.  In Benjamin’s particular sense of mourning, which
bends the political into the aesthetic and the aesthetic into the
political, a tension characterizes the present, casting our
normativity in a new light.  It is in this vein that he writes in
his Theses that,
Where a chain of events appears before us, he
sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling
wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet.
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead,
and make whole what has been smashed.  But a
storm is blowing from Paradise, and has got
caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel
can no longer close them.  This storm drives him
irresistibly into the future, towards which his back
is turned, while the pile of debris before him
grows toward the sky.  What we call progress is
this storm.[24]
4. Mourning as political
Up to this point I have suggested that an aesthetic critique
allows analysis of the contest between two varying traditions
to appear without considering how the normative present
limits our very ability to problematize the discord between the
aesthetic domains of remembrance and forgetting.  I am also
arguing that this aesthetic critique forecloses how residual
violence resists the aesthetic regime that forces memory to
merely be recognized without further politicizing potentialities.
Following Du Bois and Benjamin, I think that if we develop the
political sense of mourning that opens the question of our
response to our own normative violence.  Mourning is a type
of resistance in that it tarries with the aesthetic and political
conditions that undergo from both spheres.  In this way,
remembering is wrested from merely representing the past
and put forward as a type of mourning that reconfigures the
present.  In this closing section I will argue that Du Bois’
closing chapter of The Souls of Black Folk, called “Of the
Sorrow Songs,” enhances the way Benjamin articulates the
political and aesthetic importance of mourning.  I will argue
that mourning requires that we rethink exactly those types of
violence that have been put out of play as politically emergent
crises only seen from the side of aesthetics.
In “Of the Sorrow Songs,” Du Bois examines more pointedly
the social aspects of the aesthetics of forgetting.  Of these
strange songs, which stand as the precursors to gospel music,
he writes, “They that walked in darkness sang songs in the
olden days—Sorrow Songs—for they were weary at heart.”[25]
 I want to develop this point further because, as Du Bois
argues, the sorrow songs are meaningful but they are out of
place.  The importance of these songs is not clear simply from
the idea that they are spirituals or inspirational songs.  They
link the present to an oral tradition and this tradition serves as
a replacement of both the broken memory and the distortions
that have passed as memory.  Shannon Zamir points out that,
for Du Bois, the use of the sorrow songs and spirituals are a
“living recollection that continues to speak to the disgraces of
the present that has by no means severed its link” to the
past.[26]  Indeed, Zamir is correct to focus on what the
memory may evoke, but the songs are songs of sorrow
according to Du Bois, and not simply songs of remembrance.
Du Bois argues that the songs are the music of deep sorrow
and struggle and that they are the inarticulate message of the
slave to the world.  Keith Byerman holds that these are the
songs that contextualized slave expressions and that they are
really counter-histories to dominant culture.[27]  They serve
as a representation to which the present community must
respond. Likewise, Robert Gooding-Williams argues that in
these songs the present is justified but only to the extent that
it is asked to respond to this message.  He writes, “To respond
to the message of the sorrow songs, white Americans must
acknowledge their implications in the lives of black Americans
by heeding the message of the sorrow songs and extending to
black Americans their civil and political rights.”[28]  Hence, in
claiming that the meaning of these songs can be explained in
the social realization of the civil rights movement  Gooding-
Williams ignores the disruptive and agitating way in which a
new meaning of political relations is required.
The fact that the songs are and remain the inarticulate
message of the slave to the world means they do not resolve
themselves but maintain a tension.  The songs preserve
something historically effaced from social memory.  Or we
might say that they retain the form of brokenness.  In any
case, they do not represent anything that can be represented.
 Rather, they preserve a tension that frames structural
violence in their preservation.  Du Bois writes, “The songs are
indeed the siftings of centuries”[29] and they are the “voice of
exile.”[30]  But they speak to the present as that which is
exiled in a particular sense.  They are not simply a musical
aesthetic of oppression but a music that makes audible the
quietude of destabilization. To represent the inarticulate is to
bring a tradition of violence into relation with the present as a
type of broken architecture.  
By making brokenness thematic, our violence is opened as a
question rather than closed as a fact of history.  As Zamir
argues, the sorrow songs are not memory but a form of
resistance to reconcile community within a totalizing ideal.[31]
When Du Bois wrote, “The child sang it to his children and
they to their children’s children, and so for two hundred years
it has travelled down to us and we sing it to our children,
knowing as little as our fathers what its words mean, but
knowing well the meaning of the music,”[32] these songs do
not simply pass on tradition. They also  condition the present
toward a critique of its formative violence as mourning
replaces memory.  They condition the possibility of how to
think of history or memory as a broken mechanism itself. 
They stand prior to the way we consider what it means to
think of this breakage as a form of resistance itself.  And, I
think that it is this sense of mourning that liquidates the
quiescence of memory that stands in contrast to post-racial
memory.  It is this shift that allows us to see post-racial
memory as a type of violence.
Let me illustrate further the significance of amplifying the
breaking point between memory and mourning given Du Bois
and Benjamin’s analysis with an interpretation of the 2004 film
memorial, The Untold Story of Emmitt Louis Till.  In the film
much effort is made to represent the life of the young man,
his tragic death, and the significant way his death was used as
a catalyst for social change.  The film retraces the events of
the summer of 1955, when the fourteen-year-old Emmitt
Louis Till, from Chicago, visited his relatives  in Money,
Mississippi for the first time.  The film attempts to remember
his life beyond the scope of his lynching.  However, the film
cannot work as a way of remembering his life without also
mapping out the political sense of mourning.
The interviews in the film are meant to carve out a place for
the memory of Emmitt Till.  Each relative traces the boundary
between memory and mourning in this collection of
recollections.  But the place of appearance is equally important
as the displacement of appearance.  His mother, Mamie Till,
for instance, recalls that she was first informed that the body
had been exhumed from the bottom of a river after it had
been found tied by barbed wire to a cotton gin.  She is told
that the body will remain in Mississippi and she is forced to
travel to Mississippi to be present at the trial.  The cotton gin,
Mississippi, and the trial all provide a memory that is
punctuated by forgetting.
Mourning breaks the political in critical ways.  Following Du
Bois and Benjamin, we need to think how there is still
something that appears de-politicized and that counts as a
type of mourning, since mourning does not settle the issue but
rather makes the limits of our sensibility questionable.  Thus it
is just as significant that Mamie Till insisted on having the
body returned to Chicago as it is that she made a point of
holding an open coffin funeral because each marked a type of
refashioning. When she defended her decision to hold an open
coffin funeral for Till, she said that the world needed to see
what they had done to her son in order to begin to pose the
question of what we are doing to ourselves.  Each
displacement of the appearance of residual violence is resisted
by a placement of memory, and, how memory becomes post-
racial rests on placing memory.
What follows from a political sense of mourning is not a
politics but rather a point of departure that allows for a chance
to refashion our normative conceptions.  It is  precisely these
normative concepts of post-raciality that need to be shown in
a questionable light, a light that places politics at odds with
the political and the normative at odds with its own violence.
 I think what this means is that post-racial memory signals a
need to question how our memory is a type of progress and at
the same time a fire alarm that rings every minute for sixty
seconds.[33]
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